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Considerations Regarding the European System 
for the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CRISTINA SÂMBOAN
Abstract. Phrased in idealistic terms and having benefi ted from positive and fastidious correlative obligations, 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) – also termed “claim-rights” – have long been regarded as “poor 
relatives” of their elder “brothers”, i.e. civil and political rights (CPR) or “liberty-rights”, which are surrounded by 
an aura of historic authority and judicial force. These rights have often been pushed by doctrine towards the fi eld 
of legal rhetoric. However, jurisprudence has proved that, despite such criticism, ESCR may well be subject to 
judicial control, either by the indivisibility principle of human rights or interpreting correlative obligations. The 
article aims to show that, by virtue of its complex structure, the European system for the protection of human 
rights contributes to enhancing the judicial effi ciency of ESCR in social space. The understanding of this 
phenomenon may be used by the national advocate for a more effi cient handling of international instruments for 
the protection of human rights. The method used here will be the comparative jurisprudential analysis. 
Keywords: economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR), civil and political rights (CPR), European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), justiciability, jurisprudence
1. ESCR AND DCP – EQUAL AND INDIVISIBLE RIGHTS, YET SUBJECT TO 
UNEQUAL JUDICIAL PROTECTION AND DIFFERENT LEGAL TREATMENT
The legal consecration of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) is grounded on the 
ascertainment that “the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want 
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, 
social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights”, in the Preamble of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
ICESCR).
The above text, dated 19 December 1966, completed the international construction for 
the protection of human rights initiated by the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948 and 
carried forward by the enacting by consensus, on 16 December 1966, of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1 In addition, the new Covenant was meant to 
address the Marxist criticism on human rights, which denounced the “hypocrisy” of speech 
concerning civil and political rights under the conditions of profound social inequities.2
1 Hereinafter abbreviated as ICCPR.
2 In his turn, Anatole France sarcastically referred to the “majestic equality of the law which 
prohibits both rich men and poor men alike from sleeping under bridges, begging in the street and 
stealing bread” (Le lys rouge, ch. VII, 1894).
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Despite the appearance of normative symmetry, the two texts set forth different 
treatments (Etinski 2011: 6).3 Correlative obligations incumbent upon signatory States are 
immediate obligations implying compliance and insurance, in the case of ICCPR, while the 
terminology of ICESCR is based on the premise of progressive achievement of the rights in 
question, “within the limits of the available resources”.4 ICCPR provides for a Committee 
of Human Rights, while ICESCR5 does not provide for a similar body, and a facultative 
Protocol setting forth a protection mechanism through the opportunity of individual claim 
submission is in place only with respect to ICCPR, without ESCR enjoying such protection. 
The attempts to balance the warranty systems only materialized almost half a century later, 
on 5 May 2013, when a similar facultative Protocol entered into force, fi nally setting forth, 
at an international level, the controversial theory of ESCR’s capacity to stand in court 
(Crăciunean 2011).6
The European system of human rights gives rise, on a regional scale, to the UN dual 
and asymmetric mechanism for human rights protection (different legal treatments of CPR 
and ESCR, the fi rst benefi tting from enhanced warranties) in its specifi c manner, yet 
characterised by an increased degree of judicial effectiveness and a more coagulated 
political will of member states to comply with their obligations (Miga-Beșteliu 2003: 202, 
224; Gondoin).7 Signed in Torino on 18 October 1961, the European Social Charter (ESC) 
was intended to be a social replica of the European Convention of Human Rights. The 
latter, that had been entered into more than a decade earlier,8 is the fi rst treaty agreed upon 
within the Council of Europe and being conceived – in the same spirit as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights – as a reply to war experience and an antidote to 
totalitarianism; protected rights have both a civil and political nature, and although they do 
not come out in large numbers, the warranty system is, however, really impressive: for the 
fi rst time people may have recourse to a genuine international jurisdictional instance to 
complain against their own state for the breach Council of obligations undertaken by the 
Convention and, furthermore, have a means of obtaining a “fair satisfaction”9 for the 
3 For a detailed analysis of the drafting differences between ICCPR and ICESCR, as well as the 
metabolism of enacting the two Covenants. please see Etinski.
4 Art. 2 of 1 ICESCR.
5 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) was set up by the 
Economic and Social Council of the UN Organization only in 1985 – thus lacking a conventional 
feature. 
6 The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
was adopted on 10 December 2008 by the 63rd session of the General assembly of the UN Organization 
and was open for signing by all states signing, ratifying or adhering to ICESCR, being scheduled to 
enter into force within 3 months as of the date when the 10th ratifi cation or accession instrument was 
deposited. This last condition was fulfi lled on 5 May 2013. For a detailed analysis of the content of 
the Covenant. please see Crăciunean.
7 Space pattern and the subject hereof do not allow a thorough analysis of the effectivness of 
onusian mechanisms of protection of human rights.  It is worth mentioning, however, that the duties 
of the two committees do not have a jurisdictional nature, their decisions are not binding, and their 
enforcement is ensured rather by political leverages (please see also Miga-Beșteliu). For a more 
detailed analysis (please see also Gondoin, accessed: 25.10.2013)
8 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed at 
Rome, on 4 November 1950, and entered into force on 3 September 1953 (13 years prior to the 
enacting of ICPCR and ICESCR!)
9 Art. 41 of the Covenant.
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incurred prejudice. Moreover, the court decision is binding and has a direct effect on the 
internal order of the Member,10 while its enforcement is supervised by the Ministries 
(Shany).11
The European Social Charter lacks such warranties and was not even adopted as easily 
and quickly. It required almost ten years (Voiculescu 2009: 82) to complete and, 
symmetrically opposite to ECHR, it distinguishes itself especially through the number of 
the protected rights (economic and social), and less through the control mechanism. A sole 
mechanism of control was established initially, through the system of reports (Voiculescu 
2009: 93–94)12 that are to be submitted by each State to the European Committee of Social 
Rights (hereinafter ECSR), which, based on the reports, issues conclusions on the degree of 
compliance of national circumstances with the provisions of the Charter. ECSR’s 
interpretation is binding for the respective State – the Charter itself, despite its name, is not 
a mere declaration of principle, but an international convention mandatory for the states 
which ratifi ed it – yet there are no specifi c legal leverages for the control of state compliance 
with the conclusions of ECSR.
It was only half a century later (November 1995) that an additional Protocol 
(Voiculescu 2009: 84)13 established the procedure of collective claims,14 a quasi-judicial 
system which mitigates the Charter’s mechanism of control and entitles NGOs, trade unions 
or employers’ organizations that have consultative status with the Council of Europe, as 
well as trade unions and employers organizations that are representative at national level, 
according to the legislation of the respective State, to claim potential non-compliance in 
respect of Member States with regard to the obligations undertaken by the Charter. 
However, the claims may not refer to singular cases since, as may be noted, they cannot be 
submitted by national, non-governmental organizations (other than representative trade 
unions and employers’ organizations).15 As regards ECSR decisions, they are binding for 
the State concerned, but similarly to the reports, no mechanism to impose the enforcement 
is established. 
As may be noted, at both the international and European level – the most elaborated 
regional system for the protection of human rights – there are signifi cant differences 
10 Vermeire v. Belgium, claim no. 12849/87
11 Signifi cant differences compared to recommendations of onusian Committe of Human Rights. 
For a detailed analysis of CRO effectivness (please see also Shany, accessed: 25.10.2013).
12 This system was nuanced during time. At present, the reports are elaborated depending on the 
categories 4 topics. For details (please see Voiculescu).
13 During time, the Charter was completed by three additional protocols (1988, 1991, 1995). 
Therefore, on 3 May 1996, the Revised European Social Charter (hereinafter referred to as RESC) 
was enacted, replacing the 1961 Charter and including the amendments thereto, as well as new rights. 
The Charter set forth an unusual ratifi cation system, which allows a certain margin of option for the 
signatory States by accepting a core of mandatory rights to which a set of other rights is added. This 
ratifi cation mechanism refl ects, in its turn, political sensitivities arising from ESR. Under Law 
74/1999, Romania ratifi ed 17 articles, namely 65 numbered paragraphs. For details please see 
Voiculescu.
14 A system similar to the one existing within the International Labor Organization.
15 The opportunity to allow the access of national NGOs to the procedure of collective claims is 
ensured by the Charter, but only to the extent that the States which ratifi ed the additional Protocol 
dated 1995, execute an explicit statement in this respect. So far, only Finland expresses the political 
will to allow Finish non-governmental organizations to submit ECSR collective claims.
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between the legal treatments applicable to the two categories of rights: civil and political 
rights (CPR), on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) on the 
other, and such differences obviously disadvantage ESCR in terms of judicial warranties. It 
should be noted that this happens against the background of the international consecration 
of the equal importance and indivisibility of all fundamental rights under the Vienna 
Declaration of 1993.16
2. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (ESCR) – 
JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS?
The disagreeable status of ESCR (“rights of the poor” or “poor rights”?) defi nitely comes 
from the way in which they have been expressed in international treaties, in terms that 
remind one especially of electoral rhetoric than legal terminology. The right to work, the 
right to food, the right to a minimum income, the right to social security, the right to housing 
“... Can hunger be eradicated, poverty be fought against, unemployment be eliminated or 
can general welfare be assured through justice?”17 (Roman  2012) What remedies can give 
the specifi c judge of some problems whose solution requires time, staging, a programmatic 
approach, budget appropriation and so on? Or if they do in fact do it, is this not an 
interference with the powers of the Parliament – the one which decides on budgetary 
distribution and the allocation of resources (the democratic argument)? On the other hand, 
is the judge capable through his specifi c expertise and by the very nature of his prerogatives 
– application and interpretation of the law: juris dictio – to provide solutions for issues that 
require technical, economic, social expertise, bref, a complex approach and “polycentric” 
intervention (the technical argument)?18 (Horowitz 1977: 25–32.) In other words: are ESCR 
justiciable? Can they indeed be effective in front of the courts? Or are they rather part of the 
evasive register of legal rhetoric? Who may take such rights seriously, as a matter of fact 
(Roman 2012: 11)19?
The key stone of discourse for challenging ESCR is, however, in the distinction based 
on the type of duties generated by these kinds of rights: positive onerous obligations, 
contrary to the principle of separation of powers (hence the name, being more or less a 
pejorative of a “rights-claim”) versus the negative comfortable obligations of simple 
abstention from the state debtor, correlative to the “freedom-rights”, the civil and political 
16 Global Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 25 June 
1993 (UNO doc.A/CONF.157/23), 5 and subseq.
17 Assimilation by law of some social causes and the idea of  providing judicial remedies where 
economic solutions are required have long been sharply fought by the doctrine. For French doctrine 
diffi culties, e.g., to “digest”, the insertion in the law of some social or economic programatic 
objectives and, in general, concerning the justiciability of ESCR, see Roman.
18 The so-called “judicial policy-making”. See also Horowitz.
19 The “irony of history”: ESCR were meant to be the response to the marxist criticism of the 
address of the alleged “abstract” character of the revolutionary bourgeois rights, the civil and political 
ones, which would have meant nothing without the “true”, real and concrete rights: social and 
economic rights. Times have changed, as well as ideologies and, along with them, the concept of 
human rights: civil and political rights have become the “real” rights, while their poor relatives were 
evacuated by the doctrine in the box containing “letters to Santa Claus”. But times have changed 
again, ESCR left the letter box and claim, in a more sustained and more successful fashion, the status 
of “fundamental rights” and an equal place in the panoply of human rights.
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rights. One thing is to require the state to ensure a “right to housing” to all its nationals and 
another thing is to pretend it to guarantee the citizens’ right to free speech or the right to 
vote, or the right to life. The fi rst aspect requires a program of action, resources, positive 
actions – easy to enforce, diffi cult to fulfi l, even more diffi cult to monitor; the second 
involves simple abstention, non-intervention practices and the performance of obligations is 
easily accomplished judicially by simply removing the disturbing or injuring actions.
It is not the purpose of this paper to review the opinions expressed over time on the 
justiciability of ESCR. We confi ne ourselves to report that this type of discourse, focused 
on the distinction of “positive obligations vs. negative obligations”, dominated with 
authority for a long time and not with just the specifi c doctrine, but also with the 
international meetings, works and debates, concerning the ICESCR (International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (Roman 2012: 15; Etinski 2011: 4, 5).
While suspicions dominated the legal theory, benefi ciaries were taking their rights 
seriously and the national and international courts were taking their duties seriously, while 
jurisprudence began to be confronted with the fi rst raids of ESCR from paper into reality. 
But “on site” confrontation, subjecting ESCR to the tough test of reality, revealed a 
surprising observation: negative obligations are not the exclusive prerogative of CPR,20 just 
as those positive ones are not a single characteristic of ESCR (Chatton 2007: 53, 54);21 
achievement progressivity may also cover a CPR,22 as immediate execution can be perfectly 
20 Negative obligation of state non-interference may be violated, for example, by a decree 
issued by the Greek state, which prohibits regular offi cers from leaving the army earlier than a 25-
year period into their career, with the consequence of violating the labour right and freedom. Such 
legislation is assimilated to  forced and compulsory labour (Collective complaint 7/2000); or through 
a legislative amendment which prohibits health care to persons who are illegally in France (“les sans-
papiers”) and their children with the consequence of breaching the right to health and children’s rights 
provided under Art. 13 and 17 in the Charter (Collective Complaint no. 14/2003); or the systematic 
practice of the Italian police regarding expulsion or threat of expulsion of homeless people from their 
places of residence, as well as destruction of their property – which is in violation of the right to 
housing provided by Art. 31 of the Charter.
21 Currently, there is almost no provision in the ECHR which should not have been, at a certain 
time, likely to be enforced through a positive obligation of the State. Positive obligation intervention 
of the State in the matter of CPR coincides, in fact, in most cases, with the protection obligation 
corresponding to the intermediate level of stratifi ed obligations. The obligation of protection requires 
State intervention as regards the injuries to the rights by the third parties and is mainly derived from 
the provisions of Article 1 of the Convention, which obliges the states to provide for all persons 
within their jurisdiction, the rights protected by the Convention. The obligation to provide a legislative 
framework for an adequate and suitable protection to the right in question, violated by the British 
state by maintaining a law permitting corporal punishment “of reasonable nature” (A. v. United 
Kingdom), the obligation to make an effective investigation concerning murder, torture or forced 
disappearances (Guerra and others v. Italy, case no. 14969/89), the obligation to information and 
advice on harmful emissions of a neighbouring industry, likely to violate the right to integrity, privacy 
and observance of domicile (Makaratzis v. Greece, case nr. 50385/99) are just a few examples of such 
obligations. ECtHR casuistry concerning positive obligations is, however, much broader (see also 
Chatton).
22 Pilot judgments typically fall very well into this category. In the Oneryildiz v. Turkey, for 
example (case no. 48939/99), the Court fi nds that the Turkish state “should have ensured the 
coordination and cooperation between different administrative authorities (...) so that they do not 
allow that the risks they have been made aware of [it is about an explosion produced by gases 
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compatible with ESCR; in fact, both categories of rights create a varied set of obligations 
and, briefl y, the theory of negative and positive obligations is simply a myth. In its turn, the 
exegesis of works, reports (Final Observations and Conclusions) and General Observations 
of control international bodies has also contributed to the mitigating of the cleavage between 
the two categories of rights, acknowledging the jurisprudential fi ndings (Chatton 2007: note 
no. 7).
As expected, the doctrine retreated without delay to these fi ndings,23 so that, currently, 
the focus of discourse upon ESCR shifted from the binomial “positive-negative” to the triad 
of the so-called “stratifi ed obligations”: respect, protection and implementation.24 Reality 
is often presented in a various “mixed” way and is not easily subject to the rigors of 
doctrinal classifi cation. CPR and ESCR are, more exactly, indivisible.
3. EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF ESCR PROTECTION: EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS. 
PARALLEL OR CROSS JURISDICTIONS?
All these fi ndings obtained international consecration in the conclusions of the Vienna 
Conference of 1993 and it is no more a subject of great controversy today, but rather an 
object of further analysis. However, the new theory has not been refl ected in the international 
control and protection mechanisms, political sensitivities being suffi ciently acute yet in the 
area of social claims, so as not to allow a signifi cant progress in procedural terms. 
In the European international courts this defi ciency is limited to the following question: 
be it justiciable, as more and more tends to be accepted, can ESCR enjoy real legal 
protection, equal to that of CPR, since the body designed to provide them (the ECSR) – 
unlike the ECtHR (the competent court as regards CPR) – is not a genuine judicial body, is 
not competent to settle individual complaints and lacks mechanisms to enforce its decisions 
which, in case of failure, would lead to a simple recommendation from the Committee of 
Ministers?25
A fi rst key observation is that, actually, “clipping” is not so trenchant and it often 
happens that ESCR are, in their turn, engaged under the judicial control of the ECtHR. This 
apparent extension of competence is achieved in several ways.
On the one hand, under the indivisibility of human rights, perfectly similar situations 
lend themselves to separate qualifi cations in terms of violated rights, insomuch as – as a 
result of such indivisibility – a CPR breach also involves prejudice to an ESCR and they all 
enjoy the judicial remedies, even if the remedies are aimed at only one of the rights. Thus, 
emanated from a dust hole, which led to the death of the plaintiff’s family – o.n] worsen to the point 
of becoming a threat to people’s lives”. Failing to adopt such measures means that Turkey has violated 
the right to life. Other examples of cases in which compliance with the rights protected by the ECHR 
implies fulfi llment of some structural obligations: Fadeieva v. Russia (case no. 55723/2000), 
Broniowski v. Poland (case no. 31443/96), Monnat v. Switzerland (case no. 73604/01).
23 A signifi cant example: Benoit-Rohmer–Grewe 2003.
24 For a detailed analysis of the application of the “stratifi ed obligations” pattern in relation to 
all human rights (Chatton 2007: 49–60). 
25 The procedure is as follows: after taking the decision, CEDS will submit a report to the 
Committee of Ministers, which, on this basis, will issue a resolution by a majority of votes. In case of 
failure, CM adopts a recommendation by a majority of two thirds of the voters (Articles 8 and 9 of the 
additional Protocol of 1995).
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for example, the term “goods” referred to in Article 1 of Additional Protocol 1 to the 
Convention also includes claims subject to contributory social benefi ts;26 parental leave 
allowance is payable under the privacy right provided by Article 8, given the special, 
biological and psychological relation between parent and child;27 dismissal of some tax 
offi cials due to the reason of activity passed in KGB service is prohibited not only under 
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), but also under Article 8 (right to privacy); 
Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention are closely and clearly related to the right to health. 
Or, in the second aspect (b): the right of access to a public offi ce (protected by the right to 
work, which is a right not found in the Convention!) is reviewed by the Court under Article 
10 (freedom of expression), provided that the refusal is justifi ed by the plaintiff’s communist 
views28 and the right to social allowance is reviewed by the Court in terms of Article 6 
(right to a fair trial), given that the legislator abolishes legal proceedings covering this type 
of allowance.29 Life confronts us with complex situations which disregard doctrinal 
distinctions between CPR and ESCR, and the Court intends to take note of this fact (Barac; 
Petre).30
Another ‘gateway’of ESCR under the direct control of the ECtHR is the direct one, of 
the ratione materiae competence, part of the rights protected by the Convention having also 
social connotations, with the consequence of halving the normative protection. Thus, Art. 4 
of the ECHR corresponds to Article 1, second paragraph of the CSEr (prohibition of forced 
labour); Art. 8 of the ECHR (right to privacy)/Art. 7, 15–17, Art. 31 of the CSEr (right to 
protection of family, children, disabled persons, the right to housing); Art. 11 of the ECHR/
art. 5, 6 of the CSEr (trade union rights); Art. 2 PA 1 to ECHR/Art. 17 of the CSEr (right to 
education), and others (Chatton 2007: 69–70).31 The principle of non-discrimination may 
also be a good access way of ESCR for the protection of the Court.32
Therefore, despite the initial intentions of the international legislator and any doctrinal 
prejudices, the areas of competence of the ECtHR and CEDS often interpenetrate and the 
consequences are just satisfactory for ESCR which therefore enjoys higher protection under 
the vigorous “umbrella” of the ECtHR.
There are also risks. It is the risk of parallel jurisprudences, of confl icting solutions, of 
“international litispendence”. Since the debtor is unique, and such debtor is the state itself 
26 Stec and others v. United Kingdom (cases no. 65731,65900/01).
27 Petrovic v. Austria, case no. 20458/92.
28 Glasenapp vc. Germany, case no. 9228/80.
29 Zielinski and others v. France, cases no. 24846/94, 34165/96, 34173/96.
30 The Court itself repeatedly emphasizes that “there is not an impassable barrier (“cloison 
etanche”) to separate the fi eld of economic and social rights by the fi eld of Convention” (Sidabras 
and Dziautas v. Lithuania, cases no. 55480, 59330/00, paragraph 47). For the lack of an “impassable 
barrier” (“cloison etanche”), see also Airey v. Ireland (case no. 6289/73) or Stec and others v. United 
Kingdom (cases no. 65731, 65900/01). For a detailed analysis of economic and social rights in the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR, see also Petre and Barac.
31 These correspondences should not be regarded as absolute similarities. About “editorial 
limits” of harmonizing these texts, see also Chatton.
32 See, for example, Zarb Adami v. Malta (case no. 17209/2002), where the plaintiff requested 
the Court to fi nd that the jury services rendered systematically at the request of the Maltese authorities 
were forced labour. Although this service is included in the list of exceptions provided for by Art. 4, 
however, the Court found a violation of the Convention, given the recruitment by the Maltese State, 
of almost exclusively men, while the number of jury women was practically insignifi cant.
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(with its authorities), the fact that Court resolutions concern only particular situations,33 
while collective complaints lead to checking the compliance of a general de facto and de 
jure situation with the provisions of the Charter, it does not prevent the risk of an institutional 
blocking or confusing situations for the benefi ciaries, in the context of some confl icting 
decisions. Or, from an even broader perspective, the risk of some non-unitary practices at 
the European level.
It should also be noted that the differences between international mechanisms for 
monitoring the enforcement of decisions taken by the two bodies (the ECtHR and ECSR) – 
the resultants, in fact, of a political choice – is not refl ected at the national level in an 
equivalent manner. Because the compulsoriness of interpretations and resolutions provided 
by the ECtHR and ECSR imposes itself with the same authority in front of a national judge, 
a state and its authorities, beyond the diversity of enforcement procedures (which is more 
consistent in the case of the ECHR) (Quesada).
The apparent weakness of ECSR control mechanisms should not be misleading. The 
international law of human rights is, in fact, a branch of public international law. However, 
in the complex and delicate equation of relationships of public international law, the 
effective enforcement of decisions taken by an international court is less dependent on the 
existence of a sophisticated control system, and rather more dependant on the political will 
of the State concerned to submit, or that of states interested in exercising political pressures 
within international bodies upon a guilty state. Nevertheless, in the European regional 
system, this common political will really exists and maybe it explains to a greater extent the 
success of the ECtHR than any other argument. And the same political will is the one to 
ultimately determine the imposing force of ECSR decisions.34
As regards interactions between the ECtHR and ECSR over time, the following 
conclusions can be drawn:
– as it has been foreseen, there were parallel disputes, subject to the same type of 
case. In these situations, a favourite trend of the ECSR can be noticed toward resolutions 
which are more favourable for the protection of ESCR;35
33 The Court repeatedly emphasized this condition: Botta v. Italy (case no. 21439/93), Jitka 
Zehnalova and Otto Zehnal v. Czech Republic (case no. 38621/97).
34  An example: as a result of an ECSR report of 1990 (Committee of Independent Experts at 
that time), Spain changed immediately its poor legislation on compulsory education period. The 
Committee had noted a gap in the Spanish law, between the minimum age for employment (16 years) 
and the maximum age for compulsory education (14 years). There remained an uncovered interval of 
2 years, where young people could not attend school, nor employ themselves. Spain complied 
immediately and amended the law in order to establish compulsory education up to the age of 16. 
Instead, Belgium needed 11 years to comply with a decision of the ECtHR concerning the abolition of 
discrimination existing in the Belgian legislation on children born out of wedlock (Marckx v. Belgium, 
case no. 6833/74). In case of certain collective complaints, partial enforcement occurred even during 
the course of proceedings (collective complaints no. 33/2006, Mouvement International ATD-Quart 
Monde v. France and no. 39/2006, FEANTSA v. France) (see interview cited at the previous footnote). 
Of course, things are not always equally promising, but such examples show that, in spite of the lack 
of control, the ECSR is, however, taken seriously. 
35  Some examples: the Court of Strasbourg has confi rmed in Glasenapp and Koziek, the 
practice of German authorities of dismissing some people from their positions as teachers on the 
grounds of Nazi (i.e. communist) beliefs which they had, invoking the obligation of loyalty to the 
State and Constitution – even in cases where the plaintiffs did not express their beliefs during the 
exercising of their job. However, the ECSR deemed that such practice harms the right to freely 
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– some of the initial divergences turn into convergences, over time, given the 
availability of the ECtHR to inspire itself from the friendlier jurisprudence of the ECSR;36
– both bodies use similar legal terminology and base their resolutions on approaching 
specifi c international law institutions for human rights. From this point of view, the ECSR 
may well be assimilated to a jurisdictional body within the rigorous meaning of the term 
(“juris diction” – to apply and construe the law, to give legal resolutions).37 However, the 
ECSR generally proves to be the promoter of a strongly argued jurisprudence, net favourable 
for the valorisation of ESCR;
– relations between the two bodies are characterized by a certain “professional 
reverentiality” evidenced by: mutual references, mutual infl uencing, willingness to use the 
practice of the other as inspiration,38 concern for harmonization and avoidance of confl icting 
resolutions. This tag does not go so far as to affect their independence and prevent them, 
when necessary, from releasing opposite resolutions. 
All these elements are encouraging for ESCR’s benefi ciaries, collective complaints 
becoming a generous option, always handy and more inviting as they are not subject to the 
limitation of domestic remedies and, in addition, they are addressed to a qualifi ed and 
benevolent “ear” (the ECSR). Things obviously are less reassuring for the state, as a debtor 
of ESCR, which, on the supposition of some contradictory resolutions, may certainly fi nd 
itself in a disagreeable situation.
Finally, some necessary considerations must be made on the place of the Luxembourg 
Court in the European regional legal “galaxy”, as well as the role and possible added value 
brought by the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the legal subject area of ESCR.
exercise a profession. Subsequently, the Court, inspired by the ECSR, revised its position in the case 
Vogt v. Germany through a highly controversial decision (but with only one dissenting opinion). 
Another parallel judgement had to deal with the assimilation of forced labour of the civil service 
replacing the military one. The jurisprudential line of the Court was to reject such an approach, so that 
such types of demands began to be based on … conscientious objection! The ECSR, however, stated 
that the civil service can be assimilated into forced labour, especially when its duration is 
disproportionate (RC no. 8/2000, QCEA v. Greece).
36 In relation to trade union freedoms, the Court admitted, in an initial phase, the “closed-shop” 
clause (Sibson v. the United Kingdom case no. 14327/88, Young, James and Webster v. UK cases no. 
7601/76, 7806/77) which, instead, in the case SN v. Sweden (RC 12/2002), the ECSR considered as 
unacceptable. Subsequently, the Court incorporated this approach in its jurisprudence, in the case 
Sørensen et Rasmussen v. Denmark (cases no. 52562, 52620/99) and in Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 
(cases no. 34503/97) where the Court expressly refers to ECSR jurisprudence.
37 Notions like “living instrument”, “effective rights”, “evolutionary interpretation”, “margin of 
appreciation”, etc. are recurrent in the terminology used by the ECSR. Also the interpretations of the 
Committee have a legal nature. Moreover, all members of the ECSR have achieved higher legal 
education (the list containing their names is available online at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
socialcharter/ ecsr/members_EN. asp,  last accessed on 25.10.2013).
38 References to ECtHR jurisprudence are nearly ubiquitous in the resolutions of the ECSR. For 
ex.: QCEA v. Greece (paragraph 22), AIAE v. France (paragraph 52), ERRC v. Greece (paragraph 20) 
and many others ... References of the ECHR to the jurisprudence of the ECSR / CSEr (examples): 
Zielinski et al. v. France, Stec et al. v. United Kingdom,Vitiello v. Italy, Campagnano v. Italy, etc. 
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4. THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (CJEU) AND ESCRS. 
INTERFERENCES WITH THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECTHR AND 
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS (ECSR). THE CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EU – AN ADDED VALUE?
4.1. Dialogue between the two Courts, the ECtHR and CJEU
The ECtHR and CJEU have been developing over time a “strategic harmony” (Paris 2012: 
168) type of relationship, which eloquently references a mutual politeness and thoughtful 
concern meant to maintain a continuous coordination between the two systems.
This relationship is based, however, on the premise of the ECtHR’s discrete “paternal” 
authority. On the one hand, when fi rst attempting to develop a human rights doctrine within 
the Union – based on a considerable regulatory defi ciency on this subject at the community 
level, until the 1992 TUE – the Court of Justice acknowledged the ECHR’s39 “special 
meaning” as a source meant to inspire with its jurisprudence integrating approach to these 
rights.40 This consecration marked the beginning of a judicial activism which is supported 
by various references to the ECtHR’s41 jurisprudence and regulated in the European Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (the “Charter”), fi rst proclaimed in December 2000, as 
adapted and proclaimed for a second time in December 2007, when it entered into force 
when the Lisbon Treaty was signed.
The Charter represents the expression of respect towards the Strasbourg Court, as its 
formulation was based on the Convention and the ECtHR jurisprudence.42 A great number 
of rights have been reproduced,43 and others codify the European jurisprudence,44 Art. 52 p. 
3 assigns ECHR interpretation as the Chart’s interpretation benchmark, and Art. 53 converts 
it into the minimal protection standard (the favor libertatis clause). 
As to the Strasbourg Court, its reference to the CJEU’s jurisprudence is complex and 
denotes a subtle, yet well-dosed balance between, the monitoring necessity, on the one 
hand, and respect for the EU’s autonomy and specifi c legal order45 on the other hand. 
Approaching the delicate issue of monitoring the Union’s legislation stems from this 
premise: there is nothing preventing the Convention signatory states from transferring their 
prerogatives to an international organization; however, this does not include the transfer of 
responsibility towards that organization, as the state will still be held responsible for any 
39 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior (case 36/75).
40 Other sources being: “international instruments for the human rights protection at which the 
Member States cooperated or which they adopted” (Nold v. Commission, case 4/73), “Member States 
constitutional traditions” (Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, case 44/79).
41 “The Court of Justice often applies the Convention, especially the ECHR’s jurisprudence 
CEDO” (The CJUE’s think piece (document de refl ecție) regarding certain aspects of the European 
Union’s accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, May 5, 2010, Luxembourg (pgf. 1.3.). See also Elinki Radiophonia Tileorassi (C-260/89), 
or Omega Spielhallen (C-36/02).
42 In the Presidium’s Explanations, the ECHR’s importance is repeatedly pointed out (The 
explanations on the Chart of fundamental rights, published in the OJ /14.12.2007 (C-303) and 
attached to the Charter).
43 Almost half of the Charter’s provisions have an equivalent in the ECHR (Art. 2, Art. 4–7, Art. 
9, Art. 10 p. 1, Art. 11 p. 1, Art. 12 p. 1, Art. 14, Art. 17, Art. 19 p. 1, Art. 21, Art. 45, Art. 47–50).
44 E.g. Ahmed  v. Austria (case no. 25964/94) or Soering c. Regatului Unit (case no. 14038).
45 For a detailed analysis of the ECtHR – CJEU relationship (Paris 2012: 149–178).
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infringement of the liability originating from this Convention.46 And this implies an indirect 
control of the EU’s legislation via these national implementation measures.47
Faced with disputes regarding the national implementation measures of the EU’s 
legislation, in an attempt to conciliate the Convention legislation with the EU’s specifi c 
legal order, the Court has been poised between the necessity of fi rm intervention48 and 
cautious “self-restraint”.49
The Strasbourg Court’s position towards the CJEU is not only about this discrete 
authority relationship, but also involves receptivity towards the latter’s jurisprudence. On 
the one hand, we have a series of references to the CJEU’s solutions50 (which denotes 
among others a concern to maintain the coherence between the two systems), and on the 
other hand, an increase in references to the Charter – which is indeed remarkable as the fi rst 
reference happened even before the Charter came into force, and even before the CJEU 
refers to it!51
It goes without saying that the success of this productive jurisprudential dialogue was 
reached when negotiations began regarding EU accession to the ECHR.52
That is all well and good, but it is not relevant to economic, social and cultural rights. 
It is true, as it has been proven, they can ricochet under the ECtHR’s jurisdiction – thus 
infl uencing the CJEU’s jurisprudence, especially after the EU’s accession to the CJEU – but 
these cases cannot be widespread and they will still remain under the Strasbourg Court’s 
specifi c responsibilities deviation category.
4.2. ESCRs in the CJEU’s Jurisprudence
As to ESCRs protection within the EU – at least until the Charter’s adoption as primary 
legislation – they hypothetically enjoyed the same protection as CPRs: they did not exist as 
regulation, but were assumed by the Court as jurisprudence with reference to the common 
constitutional traditions and the international treaties. 
46 Matthew c. Regatului Unit, case no. 24833/94, 32.
47 A situation which will of course change once the EU accesses to the ECHR. From that 
moment on, the EU will be directly controlled by the Court (see also Paris 2010: 179). This position 
was highlighted via an important decision (the Bosphorus decision) establishing it as a necessary 
condition when applying EU legislation at a national level (when the state does not benefi t from the 
appreciation margin) to ensure the fundamental rights protection which is at least the same as the 
protection ensured by this Convention.
48 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, case no. 30696/09, directly concerning the Dublin asylum 
system. Very well describing the relationship between the two Courts, therein analyzed, is the 
immediate integration by the CJEU of this solution into its own jurisprudence (N.S./Secretary of State 
for the Home Department and M.E. and others./Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform (C-411, 493/10).
49 Emesa Sugar c. Olandei, case. no. 62023/00 – the Court of Srasbourg refused to intervene in 
the CJEU’s procedures, on the basis of Art. 6 of the Convention (infringement of the right to a fair 
trial).
50 E.g., Stec v. UK (cases no. 65731, 65900/01) or DH v. Czech Republic (case no. 573250/00).
51 E.g., Bosphorus, Christine Goodwine, Sørensen et Rasmussen, Demir și Baykara…
52 See also The Draft legal instruments on the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, July 19, 2011, CDDH-UE (2011)16. For information regarding the 
accession consequences (Kokott–Sobotta 2012: 93–111).
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In exercising its specifi c EU legislation interpretation and implementation powers in 
the context of the relationships established by the Internal Market, the CJEU developed 
social jurisprudence which is rich and interesting (but nonetheless contentious). Even so, 
unlike the situations in which ESCRs were involved and where the Court does not scruple 
to reference the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, such references to international treaties – i.e. the 
European Social Charter – or national constitutions, appear only occasionally amongst the 
Court’s decisions dealing with ESCRs. The CJEU seems less willing to effi ciently draw on 
specifi c ESCRs protection treaties, or the ECSR’s specialized jurisprudence, even if it 
proclaims it will do so.
The CJEU acting this way only lead to the development of its own social jurisprudence, 
which is sheltered from any dedicated international benchmark. This is even more serious 
as, given it is subject to EU legislation which should interpret and apply it, the vast majority 
of the Luxembourg Court’s decisions are of a social nature and entail ESCRs, not CPRs. 
Let’s not forget that until Lisbon, the Court ruled only on economic and Internal Market-
related issues, corresponding to the scope of the fi rst “pillar” of EU, while issues relating to 
the “area of freedom, safety and justice”, namely the most competent with respect to 
bringing into discussion the CPRs observance, came under the CJEU’s control only when 
the Lisbon Treaty came into force.53 We are obviously not stating that CPRs are vulnerable 
only in terms of criminal matters. Clearly there are many other ways CPRs could go under 
the Court’s supervision – work and social security, via human rights indivisibility, 
relationship with EU institutions,54 non-discrimination principle, EU citizenship, etc. (as a 
matter of fact, CPRs are by their very nature a permanent probability in the meaning of 
whichever situation) – which is what actually happened. This only points out the fact that 
social issues have a preferred spot within the jurisprudence of the Luxembourg Court, these 
issues are automatically highlighted around ESCRs and hence, in this context, it was desired 
and expected that the Court consistently refer not only to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, but to 
the ECSR’s practice and jurisprudence too. Which surprisingly happened only by accident. 
This unbalanced approach was hence refl ected within the EU when the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was adopted. The Charter preamble states that the Presidium’s 
Explanations must be used to interpret it. And, although the European Social Charter is 
mentioned in the Preamble as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
explanations only refer to the latter, i.e. ECtHR jurisprudence, and to the European Social 
Charter, and not to the ECSR’s jurisprudence! Referencing only to the European Social 
Charter is not much as the rights it protects are included in the EU Charter, and, moreover, 
the EU Charter contains a lot more rights that are protected.  
This defi ciency is unfortunate as the Luxembourg Court’s social jurisprudence has 
been heavily criticised over time. This jurisprudence is characterized by a very strenuous 
activism of the Court to accelerate accession and complete the Unique Market. The Court 
53 Art. 67 TFUE placed the “third pillar” in the Union’s competence area. Even so, although 
only occasionally, the Court of Luxembourg did not miss the chance to give a decision, even 
controversial, on the alleged indirect effects of laws adopted within the third ex pillar, although the 
former JHA was excluded from its sphere of competence (C-105/03 Criminal Proceedings against 
Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285).
54 Although, as we know, individuals’ access to proceedings against European institutions 
(former Art. 230 TUE) was heavily conditioned (see also Plaumann v. Commission, 25/62). Art. 230 
was replaced by the current Art. 263 TFUE, somewhat improving the state of things as it keeps the 
direct interest requirement, but eliminates that of the individual interest.
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seems so absorbed in this accession effort that when performing its “uniform interpretation” 
of EU legislation, it gave treaties unexpected meanings that would surprise even the 
founding fathers (Sâmboan 2010).55
Besides, in its interpretations, the Court often removes areas in the exclusive 
competence of the states and subjects them to the Internal Market integrationist harshness. 
To justify its position, the Court resorts to the following logic: is it true that in the respective 
domain (i.e. national social security system or health insurance), the Member States retain 
autonomy, but this autonomy does not eliminate the need to apply the EU law, namely the 
current Art. 56 and 57 TFUE.56 
To which degree can this approach – being obviously detrimental to Member States 
sovereignty – favour ESCRs, is debatable. For example, the acknowledgement of the 
applicant’s possibility to receive better health care in another Member State’s hospital, 
because of the national healthcare plan offered by their own state, it initially seems to be at 
fi rst a better solution for patients. But when applied on a larger scale, this solution can 
unbalance national healthcare systems, as it will bring considerable fi nancial pressure upon 
them, and this will fi rst put at a disadvantage the low-income individuals who cannot afford 
to pay the high travel costs between states (O’Gorman 2011: 1833–1861). The same logic 
can be applied to several other similar decisions of the Court,57 and the conclusion is not 
always benefi cial to ESCRs.
The only thing the Luxembourg Court does is fulfi l the tasks it received: uniform 
application of treaties aiming to create an internal market where goods, people, services and 
assets move freely. This is not a legal objective, but rather a political one. And this 
ambivalence of EU legislation weighs down on the Court’s activity, preventing it from 
acting as a neutral legal body, a characteristic of each legal authentic body.  
The adoption of the Fundamental Rights Charter seems benefi cial in this context as, 
for the fi rst time in the EU’s history, a clear ESCRs catalogue has the same legal power as 
the treaties. But art. 51 (1) of the Charter mentions that it addresses only those situations 
55 For instance, it is hard to believe that by the term “workers” the treaties’ authors and 
signatories considered those looking for a job (Royer – 48/75; R vs. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex 
parte Antonissen – 292/89), or that by workers’ “family members” the authors considered their 
partners (Netherlands vs. Reeds – 59/75), or that regarding the possibility to stay on the territory of 
the Member State after the end of the employment, the authors also considered those who lost their 
jobs, or that the rights bound to European citizenship (stipulated in a rigorous and restraining way by 
TUE) could be extended into the Member States’ social insurance area (Grzelczyk – 184/99), etc. The 
Court brought so many important changes in this area, that they have been integrated into the EU law 
(Directive 2004/38/EC), which brings up a new dimension of the EU democratic defi cit.
56 Kohllv.Union des Caisses de Maladie, 1998 E.C.R. I-1937; Geraets-Smits &Peerboms, 
2001E.C.RI-5473; V.G. Mulle-FauréandE.E.M. van Rietv Onderlinge Waarborgmaat schappij 
ZAOZorgverzekeringen, 2003 E.C.R.I--4509; Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, 2006 
E.C.R.I-4325.
57 The weaknesses of this jurisprudential approach have been revealed on the occasion of the 
controversial “Quartet Laval”: a set of solutions that Court gave consecutively from 2005 to 2006, 
and which perfectly highlighted the confl ict between social rights (union-related rights in this case) 
and the internal market integration requirements. The analysis of these decisions’ impact on the 
Member States’ social policies was heavily discussed in the literature. (C-438/05 International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) v. Viking Line; C-341/05 
Laval un Partneri v. SvenskaByggnadsarbetareförbundet; C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land 
Niedersachsen).
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where the EU’s law is to be applied. This note (for which the Charter has been heavily 
criticised) (O’Gorman 2011: 1857) brings about a brutal fl at effect, namely it maintains the 
confl icting nature of “fundamental rights – freedoms of the market” binomial.
This is why referencing ECSR’s solid expertise and generous, neutral and well-
balanced jurisprudence, would be welcomed. And this is also probably why this 
jurisprudence is so tenaciously avoided. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The existence of three European judicial bodies dealing with ESCRs benefi ts them. But this 
praetorian triangle is imperfect and we can symbolically shape it at an angle where the top 
is the ECtHR to which the CJEU and ECSR are tied, but without any similar relation 
between the last two. 
The fact that the ECtHR is the one which enjoys the link statute somewhat diminishes 
the system’s weaknesses, as it is at the same time the strong one: its decisions are not as 
fragilely enforceable as the ECSR’s solutions, and its jurisprudence is protected from 
political conditioning unavoidably affecting the CJEU. Hence the authority it has compared 
to the other two and the legal role model it became over time can vigorously infl uence their 
activity.
The major disadvantage of the system is that the ECtHR ensures ESCRs protection 
only indirectly. The true authority specializing on ESCRs is the ECSR. Ergo re-establishing 
this third connection, between the CJEU and ECSR, could greatly contribute to the clever 
stabilization of the tumultuous relationship between the Internal Market and ESCRs. Thanks 
to its thorough expertise and impartiality, the ECSR could offer solutions to the CJEU to 
resolve the complex issues which it has to deal with. But in order to accomplish this, the 
EU judge must listen to the ECSR’s suggestions58. It is needless to say that the EU’s 
accession to the European Social Charter is the most desirable alternative.
Beyond these weaknesses, the superiority of the ESCRs European protection system is 
unquestionable and it is this richness in instruments that ensures its drive and vigour.
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